Abstract. This article analyzes hedge funds' expansion during 2000-09 and its implications for stock returns. Hedge funds more than doubled their equity ownership prior to the 2007-09 financial crisis. In this expansion period, their trading predicts increasing onequarter-ahead stock returns and return reversals in the 2nd year. These reversals stem from the expansion of mature funds, while young funds' trading predicts one-quarter-ahead returns without future reversals. The above price pressures disappear when hedge funds shift to contractions in the financial crisis. These findings are consistent with mature funds' expansions exerting pressures on equities and young funds possessing stock picking skills.
Introduction
Hedge funds experienced extraordinary capital inflows over the 1st decade of the 2000s, particularly in early and mid-2000s: hedge fund research surveys show that the total assets under management of the hedge fund industry grew by $1,344 billion from $456 billion in 2000 to $1.8 trillion in 2007, which more than tripled the $356 billion increase in the previous 7 years from slightly less than $100 billion in 1993 to $456 billion in 1999. Deuskar et al. (2011) call the early 2000s the "boom" period of the hedge fund industry. Such capital inflows naturally lead to hedge fund expansions in security markets and raise questions on the associated implications for security prices. Do such expansions pressure hedge funds to make suboptimal investment as suggested by Berk and Green (2004) ?
1 Does it affect security prices? Further, do the demand contractions of hedge funds in the financial crisis of 2007-09 (Ben-David, Franzoni, and Moussawi, 2012) alleviate these expansion effects if they exist? This article explores the above questions by analyzing the impacts of hedge fund expansions on stock returns.
Large capital inflows may cause hedge funds to increase demand for some stocks and shift the relative demand of other stocks correspondingly. These demand shifts are not necessarily driven by skill: e.g., diseconomies of scale in Berk and Green (2004) ; yet they may be strong enough to affect stock prices if the demand and supply curves of stocks are not perfectly elastic. 2 This will lead to a positive relation between hedge funds' net-buys and near-term stock returns, which we call the "demand" hypothesis. Further, this return-predictability is expected to be transient and reverse in the future because the above demand shifts are not driven by information about stocks' intrinsic values.
Two other explanations can also lead to a positive relation between hedge fund demands and near-term stock returns. First, hedge funds may be shortterm oriented and pressure corporate managers to maximize near-term profits at the cost of future value. Such behavior has been documented by Bushee (1998 Bushee ( , 2001 ) for transient institutions and may exist among hedge funds as well in light of recent evidence for hedge funds' strong influences on corporate managers. 3 We call this hypothesis the "short-termism" hypothesis. It predicts near-term return-and earnings-predictability of hedge fund demands and future return and earnings reversals, while both are expected to concentrate in stocks for which hedge funds unwind trades before return reversals to avoid losses. 4 The second alternative explanation, which we call the "skill" hypothesis, contends that hedge funds have stock picking skills and trade on superior information about expected returns, thereby speeding the price-adjustment process toward fundamental values. This hypothesis is consistent with the general image of the hedge fund industry, particularly in its expansion period. For example, the Credit Suisse First Boston hedge fund index delivered an annual return of 7.73% from 2000 to 2006, when the annualized return for S&P 500 is merely 1.18%. Under the skill hypothesis, hedge funds' equity demands should be associated with near-term return-and earningspredictability but not future return reversals.
Given the heterogeneity among hedge funds, it is also conceivable that the above three explanations co-exist. We make a distinction between older and younger funds, and call the former "mature" funds and the latter "young" funds. We hypothesize that the demand and/or short-termism effects may be stronger for mature funds, while young funds may have more skills, for several reasons. First, mature funds' records of weathering market ups and downs may attract capital inflows key to the aggressive expansions associated with the demand and short-termism effects. Second, the diseconomies of scale offsetting the skill effects in Berk and Green (2004) may be more pronounced for mature funds because of their large expansions. Third, agency problems may be more prevalent among managers of mature funds: as noted by Holmstrom (1982) , more experienced managers may be more likely to slack off than new managers.
This article provides evidence consistent with the demand effects of mature hedge funds and skill effects of young funds. We identify hedge funds mandatorily reporting equity holdings in 13F filings from 2000 to 2009 and find persistent and rapid expansions in their equity ownership in the seven and half years before the financial crisis of 2007-09. 5 Consistent with evidence in Ben-David, Franzoni, and Moussawi (2012) , these expansions are followed by sell-offs in crisis. Similar to findings in Griffin and Xu (2009) , hedge funds in our sample exhibit weaker preferences for liquidity and weaker aversions to volatility than other institutional investors. Further, compared with other institutional investors, hedge funds' demands for stock characteristics are much less stable over time, thereby making ownership change an appropriate demand measure for them.
In the period of hedge fund expansion, we show there is a strong and positive relationship between hedge fund demands and one-quarter-ahead stock returns. However, it is unlikely for this return-predictability to stem from stock picking skills because of its transient nature: hedge fund trading is negatively related to stock returns in the 2nd subsequent year. An investment strategy that buys stocks in the top quintile of hedge fund demands and shorts stocks in the bottom quintile earns an abnormal return of 1.21% in the next 3 months after adjusting for risk characteristics including size, book-to-market ratio, and momentum, but experiences a reversal of 0.89% in the 2nd subsequent year.
Hedge funds' drastic shift from rapid expansions to sharp contractions during financial crisis is accompanied by changes in their predictive power for future returns. In the crisis period, the above expansion-related return reversals no longer exist. Instead, corroborating evidence in Cici, Kempf, and Puetz (2011) , we find hedge fund sell-offs are associated with return reversals in the 1st subsequent year. Such contraction-led changes in hedge funds' relationship with future returns render support for the demand effects in the precrisis period, and lead us to focus on the this period in disentangling the demand, short-termism, and skill hypotheses.
The long-run return reversals in the precrisis period can be explained by either the demand or short-termism hypotheses. To disentangle them, we divide stocks into two groups based on whether hedge funds unwind their current trades within the next 12 months or not, and find that the above long-run return reversals are driven by the group without trade unwinding prior to return reversals. These findings contradict the short-termism hypothesis and suggest that, at the aggregate level, our results in the precrisis period are most consistent with the demand hypothesis.
To examine the relative strength of the demand, short-termism, and skill effects among mature and young hedge funds, we divide hedge funds based on the cross-sectional median of fund age and find that mature funds' equity ownership is significantly larger. More importantly, mature funds' ownership growth dominates that of young funds and is the driving force for hedge fund expansions in the precrisis period. The findings documented above for the precrisis period, particularly those on long-run return reversals, are almost entirely driven by the expansions of mature funds. Moreover, these return reversals concentrate in periods of high mature fund expansions and disappear in other periods. Trading by young hedge funds, in contrast, positively predicts one-quarter-ahead stock returns without future return reversals. To further examine the skill effects of young funds, we explore whether their trading contains information about firms' future earnings news unexpected by other market participants, measured by earnings announcement abnormal returns. Consistent with our earlier findings, young funds' trading positively predicts one-quarter-ahead earnings announcement abnormal returns, while mature funds' trading does not. 6 These results indicate that the superior performance of young hedge funds documented by previous research such as Aggarwal and Jorion (2010) and Boyson (2008 Boyson ( , 2010 may stem from knowledge about stock fundamentals.
This article is the first to examine the implications of hedge fund expansions for stock returns and to disentangle the demand, short-termism, and skill effects across hedge fund groups. Our analyses of the price pressures of mature funds' expansions in equity markets identify a clear mechanism through which hedge funds lead stock prices to significantly deviate from intrinsic values, thereby adding to the institutional price pressure literature (e.g., Coval and Stafford, 2007) . By documenting the changes in hedge funds' predictive power for future returns during and after the recent financial crisis, we also contribute to the literature on hedge fund behavior in crises including Sadka (2010) , Cella, Ellul, and Giannetti (2011), and Moussawi. (2012) . Moreover, there is an emerging literature on stock price manipulation by hedge funds (e.g., Cici et al., 2011; Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik, 2011; Ben-David, et al., 2011) showing such manipulations inflate fund returns and therefore improve rankings and attract flows. Our findings on the strong but transient correlation between hedge fund expansions and increasing near-term returns are consistent with these studies and indicate that funds' buying may mechanically improve short-run performance, and therefore should be controlled for in performance evaluation. Further, evidence in these studies implies that the capital inflows behind the rapid hedge fund expansions in the precrisis period documented in our article may at times be driven by inflated fund performance.
Our work also complements the evidence in the hedge fund activism literature (e.g., Brav, Jiang, and Kim, 2009 ). Since our findings show that hedge funds' fast trade unwinding does not drive the long-run return reversals associated with their equity demands, the effects of hedge fund activism on firm performance documented in this literature are unlikely to stem from the corporate myopia imposed by hedge funds on corporate managers and it is doubtful that hedge funds impose such pressures at all. Finally, our findings on young hedge funds' stock-picking skills and the lack of such skills among mature funds point out a direction to reconcile the gap in the literature where some studies including Ackermann, McEnally, and Ravenscraft (1999) , Brown, Goetzmann, and Ibbotson (1999) , Ibbotson and Chen (2006) , Kosowski, Naik, and Teo (2006) , and Agarwal, Boyson, and Naik (2009) , document abnormal returns for hedge funds, while other studies such as Asness, Krail, and Liew (2001) , Amin and Kat (2003) , and Griffin and Xu (2009) find the opposite.
The rest of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 describes data and sample selection and presents summary statistics. Section 3 examines the determinants of hedge fund ownership and trading. Section 4 studies the relationship between hedge fund trading and future stock returns. Section 5 explores the differences between mature and young hedge funds. Section 6 concludes.
Data and Sample Selection

THE HEDGE FUND SAMPLE
In this section, we describe the procedure of collecting and compiling the hedge fund sample used in this study. Since 1978, all institutional investors with over $100 million under management must file quarterly 13F forms for all US equity positions worth more than $200,000 or consisting of more than 10,000 shares. The 13F reporting requirements apply regardless of whether an institution is regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) or not.
7 Thus, hedge funds are required to make 13F filings, provided their holdings of US stocks exceed the thresholds specified above. It is worth noting that these large thresholds imply that hedge funds with 13F filings are the ones active in equity markets and their equity trading strategies are likely to be important for their overall performance.
We start from the list of institutional investors in Thomson-Reuters' 13F database. In this database, institutions are divided into five types: (i) bank trust departments; (ii) insurance companies; (iii) investment companies and their managers; (iv) independent investment advisers; and (v) others. We exclude institutions classified as type 1 or type 2.
8 For each remaining institution, we manually check its SEC ADV forms and like Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004) and Griffin and Xu (2009) , require an institution to have more 7 See www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/13ffaq.htm for details. 8 It is well known that the type classification in the 13F database is not accurate after 1998. However, the classification errors are almost entirely driven by misclassifying types 3 or 4 institutions as type 5 (Lewellen, 2011) and therefore do not affect our sample. than 50% of investment listed as "other pooled investment vehicles" including private investment companies, private equity, and hedge funds, or more than 50% of clients as "high net worth individuals" to be included in our hedge fund sample. We also require the institutions to charge performance-based fees to be included in the hedge fund sample. Finally, we manually check the website of each institution satisfying the above requirements to confirm whether its primary business is hedge funds.
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One possible concern for our sample is some hedge fund holding companies may not register as investment advisors and hence do not file ADV forms. This issue is of little significance because a 2004 SEC investment advisor rule amendment requires all US-based hedge funds with more than 14 clients, assets more than $25 million, and lockup period of less than 2 years, to file ADV forms. It also requires all internationally based hedge funds with more than 14 US-based investors to file ADV forms. All hedge funds satisfying the above requirement had to register as investment advisors by February 1 2006.
10 Thus, the large number of hedge funds that made form ADV filings in 2006 is included in our sample.
Although our sample can be extended to earlier periods, we focus on the post-2000 period. The rationale for doing so is two-fold. First, our focus is the implications of hedge fund expansions in equity markets, while the growth of the hedge fund industry driving these expansions concentrates in the post-2000 period. 11 The number of hedge funds in 13F filings and the associated asset growth become reasonable to be expected to have price impacts in equity markets only toward the end of 1990s. Second, hedge funds' destabilizing effects on stock prices in the tech-bubble period of late 1990s are well documented by Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004) and dramatically different from the price impacts we intend to study in this article. Thus, we need to avoid the biases associated with the tech-bubble period.
Because we relate hedge fund demands to stock returns in the next 3 years, our sample period ends in 2009. 12 Our final hedge fund sample includes 430 9 Some of these institutions do not have websites. However, for most of them, we were able to identify whether they are hedge funds through news search. The remaining institutions are included in the hedge fund sample because discussions with hedge fund managers indicate some hedge funds' reluctance in maintaining websites, whereas excluding these funds does not lead to qualitative changes in our results. 10 See Brown et al. (2008) for more details. 11 In unreported analyses, we link hedge fund trading in the pre-2000 period to future stock returns and find no significant relations, which is consistent with Griffin and Xu (2009 We obtain equity holding data from Thomson-Reuters' 13F database and define hedge funds' ownership of stock i in quarter t, IO i,t HF , as the number of shares collectively held by hedge funds at the end of the quarter divided by the firm's total number of shares outstanding. Similarly, equity ownership by other institutional investors, IO i,t Other , is defined as the numbers of shares collectively held by nonhedge fund institutions divided by the number of shares outstanding. We then follow Gompers and Metrick (2001) and decompose hedge funds' and other institutional investors' ownership in each stock quarter into lagged and change in ownership. Specifically,
Other . We follow Gompers and Metrick (2001) and construct control variables based on three sets of stock characteristics. The first set is related to liquidity and transaction costs. Stocks with larger market capitalizations, higher price levels, and higher share turnover tend to be more liquid. The 2nd set is related to historical stock return patterns, which includes past stock returns and book-to-market ratio. The 3rd set is related to prudence. Stocks with longer track records, higher dividend yields, lower return volatility, and are included in the S&P 500 index tend to have more prudence characteristics.
Specifically, we use the following 10 stock characteristics as control variables: (i) Size: market capitalization, defined as the product of share price and shares outstanding. Since hedge funds' and other institutional investors' equity ownerships are measured in percentage, we use natural log for all control variables except for B/M ratio, S&P 500, Yield, and the two momentum measures, RET À3,0 and RET À12,À3 . We exclude observations with negative book values. Stock return, firm age, share price, number of shares outstanding, and trading volume are from CRSP. Book value of equity, cash dividend, S&P 500 index membership, and quarterly earnings announcement dates are from Compustat. Table I Ben-David, Franzoni, and Moussawi (2012) . The next five columns present the averages of the number of stocks owned per hedge fund, the number of stocks owned by all hedge funds, as well as the mean, median, and total value of hedge funds' long-equity holdings across the four quarters of each sample year. One striking pattern in these columns is that similar to the number of funds, the size of individual hedge funds exhibits an inverted U-shape pattern over time: the average fund size in the early 2000s from 2000-02 is $2,192.44 million, while it increases by 16% to $2,552.78 million during 2004-06 and then declines to $2,231.39 million in the financial crisis period and afterward. In sum, the expansions and contractions of hedge funds in equity markets stem from both their number and size.
SUMMARY STATISTICS
Next, for each quarter in our sample period of 2000:Q1 to 2009:Q4, we calculate the cross-sectional averages of hedge fund and other institutional ownership and stock characteristics. Their time series summary statistics are reported in Panel A of Table II. The average equity ownership of hedge funds is 3.91%, while that of other institutions is 42.66%. The average stock in our sample has a market capitalization of $3,308 million, an age of 198 months, a dividend yield of 2.76%, a book-to-market ratio of 0.43, and a price level of $22.38. The average turnover and return volatility are 15.48 and 14.62%, respectively. The two momentum measures, RET À3,0 and RET À12,À3 , have means of 3.88% and 12.01%.
In Panel B of Table II , we report the time-series averages of the cross-sectional correlation coefficients between hedge fund ownership, other institutional ownership, and the 10 stock characteristics described in Section 2.2. These coefficients suggest that compared with other institutional investors, hedge funds have stronger preferences for younger, smaller stocks with higher return volatility, lower price levels, and not in the S&P 500 index. Note that these correlation coefficients should be interpreted with caution because of the correlations between stock characteristics, as reported in Panel C. In the next section, we employ multivariate regression analyses to examine the investment preferences of hedge funds and other institutional investors.
Determinants of Hedge Funds' Equity Ownership and Trading
To examine the determinants of the equity ownership and trading by hedge funds and other institutional investors, we follow Gompers and Metrick Age is the number of months since the stock first appears in CRSP. Yield is dividend yield. B/M is book-to-market ratio. Price is share price. Turnover is the average turnover in the past 3 months. Volatility is return volatility over the past 24 months. S&P 500 is a dummy variable for being in the S&P 500 index. RET À3,0 is the lagged 3-month return. RET À12À3 is the lagged 9-month return preceding the end of last quarter. Panel A presents the time-series statistics of cross-sectional averages of the main variables. Panel B presents time-series averages of cross-sectional correlations between hedge fund-and nonhedge fund ownership and stock characteristics, and Panel C presents time-series averages of cross-sectional correlations between stock characteristics. (2001) and run the following cross-sectional regression in each of the 40 quarters of our sample:
In Equation (1), IO i,t HF and IO i,t Other are hedge funds' and other institutional investors' ownership in stock i at the end of quarter t, and X i,t is the vector of 10 stock characteristics described in Section 2.2. White (1980) standard errors are used to control for heteroskedasticity. We report the average coefficients and the number of significantly positive or negative coefficients at the 5% level for the 40 regressions in Columns 1 and 2 of Table III . Cross-sectional regressions of hedge funds' and other institutions' ownership or trading are run on 10 stock characteristics in each quarter and the average coefficients over time, the number of quarters with coefficients positive and significant at the 5% level, and the number of quarters with coefficients negative and significant at the 5% level are reported. Standard errors in each quarterly cross-sectional are heteroscedasticity-consistent (White, 1980) . Size is market capitalization. Age is the number of months since the stock first appears in CRSP. Yield is dividend yield. B/M is book-to-market ratio. Price is share price. Turnover is the average turnover in the past 3 months. Volatility is return volatility over the past 24 months. S&P 500 is a dummy variable for being in the S&P 500 index. RET À3,0 is the lagged 3-month return. RET À12,À3 is the lagged 9-month return preceding the end of last quarter. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels based on the time-series t-statistics, respectively. These two columns show that both hedge funds and other institutions have a preference for liquid stocks: in both Columns 1 and 2, coefficients on the three liquidity variables, Price, Size, and Turnover, are positive and statistically significant. However, this preference is weaker among hedge funds in Column 1 than among other institutional investors in Column 2. For prudence considerations, both hedge funds and other institutional investors prefer stocks with lower dividend yields and/or not belonging to the S&P 500 index, yet they are in sharp contrast in preference for the other two prudence characteristics: hedge funds prefer younger stocks with higher return volatility, whereas other institutional investors prefer older stocks with lower return volatility, suggesting that hedge funds hold less prudent stocks than other institutional investors. Neither hedge funds nor other institutional investors are momentum investors, based on the negative coefficients on the two momentum measures, RET À3,0 and RET À12,À3 . Both hedge funds and other institutions have a preference for stocks with low book-to-market ratios, but this preference is weaker among hedge funds. We note the consistency between these findings and those in Griffin and Xu (2009) , who examine the determinants of hedge funds' and mutual funds' equity ownership and document that relative to mutual funds, hedge funds have weaker preferences for liquidity and weaker aversions to volatility.
Results in Columns 1 and 2 indicate that hedge funds' preferences for stock characteristics are much less stable over time than other institutional investors: for all stock characteristics except for Turnover and Volatility, hedge funds exhibit less persistency in ownership preferences across the 40 quarters in our sample period than other institutional investors, as illustrated by the number of quarters with significant coefficients. In other words, hedge funds' demands for stock characteristics change more frequently than other institutional investors. This lower degree of preference stability suggests that hedge fund ownership in a specific quarter constitutes a less appropriate measure for their equity demands compared to the change in ownership.
In the last two columns of Table III , we examine the determinants of hedge funds' and other institutional investors' equity trading. Specifically, we replace hedge funds' and other institutional investors' equity ownership with their trading and reestimate Equation (1). The determinants of hedge fund and other institutional trading are significantly different from those of ownership. Among the three liquidity variables, although nonhedge fund institutions tend to buy larger stocks with higher price levels, they do not have a preference for buying instead of selling stocks with higher turnover rates. Hedge funds, in contrast, are less likely to buy large stock with high HEDGE FUNDS AND EQUITY PRICES 1153
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http://rof.oxfordjournals.org/ price levels. 14 Both hedge funds and other institutions prefer to sell instead of buy stocks with prudence characteristics: hedge funds have a strong preference for stocks with high return volatility, while other institutional investors prefer non-S&P 500 stocks with low dividend yields. Both hedge funds and other institutional investors are momentum traders, based on the positive coefficients on RET À3,0 and RET À12,À3 . However, this pattern is less pronounced among hedge funds than among other institutional investors.
Hedge Funds and Stock Returns
HEDGE FUND TRADING AND STOCK RETURNS
We now turn to examining the relationship between hedge funds' equity demands and stock prices. Our sample spans across the pre-, during, and postfinancial crisis periods. Sadka (2010) documents the effects of market-wide liquidity risk on hedge funds. Relative to other periods, the financial crisis period is characterized with unique market-wide liquidity events. Thus, we are interested in understanding the changes in the relationship between hedge fund trading and stock returns across the three sub periods of our sample.
We also note that the demand and short-termism effects discussed in Section 1 stem from the expansion of hedge fund ownership, which is not always the case in our sample period because of the consolidations and liquidations among hedge funds during and after financial crisis. Figure 1 plots the mean equity ownership of funds in our hedge fund sample at the end of each year from 2000 to 2009. Consistent with Table I , this figure depicts a trend of rapid expansions of hedge funds prior to financial crisis, followed by sharp ownership declines.
To account for changes across the sample period, we divide the sample into pre-, during, and postfinancial crisis periods in analyzing the relationship between hedge fund demands and future equity returns. Specifically, following Ben-David, Franzoni, and Moussawi (2012) 
4.1.a The precrisis period
Drawing on the existing literature (e.g., Gompers and Metrick, 2001) , we run the following pooled weighted least squares regression for the precrisis period with each observation weighted by the log of the stock's market capitalization:
In Equation (2), RET it,tþ3 is the one-quarter-ahead stock return. 15 Our key variable of interest is hedge funds' trading, DIO i,t HF , while their lagged ownership, IO i,tÀ1
HF , other institutions' trading and lagged ownership, DIO i,t
Other and IO i,tÀ1
Other , and the 10 stock characteristics described in Table IV . Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics based on standard errors clustered by both stock and quarter (Petersen, 2009). 16 In Column 1, the coefficient on hedge fund trading, DIO i,t HF , is positive and statistically significant with a t-statistic of 2.90, suggesting a strong predictive power of hedge fund demands for near-term returns. This return-predictability is also economically significant: a two-standarddeviation increase in hedge fund trading leads to a 0.86% increase in one-quarter-ahead stock returns, which is equivalent to an annualized return of 3.48%. 17 In unreported analyses, we also link hedge fund trading to returns in each of the other three quarters of the 1st subsequent year and find no significant relations, and report the results for the cumulative returns in these three quarters in Column 1 of Panel C. These findings suggest that the rising returns associated with hedge fund demands in the precrisis period concentrate in the 1st quarter.
In contrast with hedge funds' return-predictability, the coefficient on other institutional investors' trading, DIO i,t Other , in Column 1 of Panel A is negative and not significant. Lagged equity ownerships by hedge funds or other institutional investors, IO i,tÀ1
HF and IO i,tÀ1
Other , do not have significant relations to one-quarter-ahead returns either. In addition to hedge fund trading, some stock characteristics also predict one-quarter-ahead stock returns: stocks with higher book-to-market ratios have higher future returns, so do stocks with lower price levels and/or lower turnover rates.
Since hedge funds' near-term return-predictability in the precrisis period is consistent with all of the demand, short-termism, and skill hypotheses discussed in Section 1, we also examine whether their trading is associated with future return reversals predicted by the demand and short-termism hypotheses but not the skill hypothesis. Specifically, we replace the one-quarter-ahead returns in Equation (2) Fama (1998) discusses the advantage of average returns relative to cumulative returns in long-run analyses. Thus, in unreported analyses, we replace cumulative returns with average returns and obtain qualitative similar and even slightly stronger results. We choose to report results from cumulative returns to be conservative. Other , and 10 stock characteristics. t-statistics based on standard errors clustered by stock and quarter (Petersen, 2009) Age is the number of months since the stock first appears in CRSP. Yield is dividend yield. B/M is book-to-market ratio. Price is share price. Turnover is the average turnover in the past 3 months. Volatility is return volatility over the past 24 months. S&P 500 is a dummy variable for being in the S&P 500 index. RET À3,0 is the lagged 3-month return. RET À12,À3 is the lagged 9-month return preceding the end of last quarter. Quarter dummies are included in all regressions. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. reported in Columns 2 and 3 of Panel A. The coefficient on DIO i,t HF in Column 2 is À0.1838 and statistically significant with a t-statistic of À2.10, implying that most of the gains in the one-quarter-ahead stock returns in Column 1 reverse in the 2nd subsequent year. Further, the return reversals complete in the 2nd subsequent year, based on the insignificant coefficient on DIO i,t HF in Column 3 for the 3rd subsequent year.
4.1.b The crisis and recovery periods
To draw comparison between hedge funds' predictive power for future returns in the precrisis period and that in the during and postcrisis periods, we rerun regressions in Panel A of Table IV for the crisis and postcrisis periods, respectively, and present results in Panel B. Columns 1-3 focus on the crisis period of 2007:Q3 to 2009:Q1. The coefficient on hedge fund trading, DIO HF , in Column 1 is positive and significant: i.e., it still positively predicts near-term returns during financial crisis, and we do not observe any return reversals in Columns 2 and 3 for the 2nd and 3rd subsequent years. However, we need to use caution in interpreting the above near-term return-predictability because Cella, Ellul, and Giannetti (2011) document return reversals in the 2nd and 3rd quarters after equity selling by institutions with high churn rates during financial crisis and indicate hedge funds may constitute a significant fraction of these sellers. Thus, we explore returns in time tþ3 to tþ12 in Column 2 of Panel C and consistent with Cella, Ellul, and Giannetti (2011), find strong return reversals in this period. This result also complements the previous research on the effects of liquidity crises on hedge funds (Sadka, 2010) and underpins the destabilization effects of hedge funds' selling pressures on stock prices in such crises. It is worth highlighting that the above return reversals stem from hedge fund sell-offs in liquidity shocks instead of systematic industry expansions. Indeed, in unreported analyses, we find these return reversals only exist in stocks with net-sells but not in those with net-buys by hedge funds. Overall, our findings for the crisis period are unlikely to be driven by the three hypotheses discussed in Section 1. Further, because hedge funds shift from expansions to contractions in equity markets during crisis, the disappearance of the 2nd-year return reversals suggests a link between these reversals and hedge funds' demand expansions in the precrisis period.
In Columns 4 and 5 of Panel B, we examine the predictive power of hedge fund trading for future returns in the recovery period of 2009:Q2 to 2009:Q4 subsequent to the financial crisis. We do not relate hedge fund trading to 3-years-ahead returns because doing so requires return information for 2012, which is unavailable from CRSP. None of the coefficients on the trading measures of hedge funds or other institutions in these two columns are significant, nor do we find any return-predictability or return reversals in tþ3 to tþ12 in Column 3 of Panel C. These findings are in contrast with results in the precrisis and during crisis periods and are interesting for indicating a shrinking difference between hedge funds and other institutions in the postcrisis equity markets. Since there are only three quarters in the postcrisis period, one may be concerned about the possibility that the lack of return-predictability stems from the short time window. Therefore, in unreported analyses, we extend the sample to the last quarter for which the one-quarter-ahead returns are available, 2011:Q3, and find very similar results to those in Column 4 of Panel B.
To illustrate the changes in the relationship between hedge fund demands and future returns over time, we plot the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) in the 36 months subsequent to high hedge fund demands in the precrisis period and afterward in Figure 2 . A stock is classified as having high hedge fund demand in a specific quarter if its net-buys by hedge funds are in the highest quintile of hedge fund trading. Abnormal returns are calculated as the difference between the return of a stock with high hedge fund demand and the weighted average return of the stocks not experiencing high hedge fund demands, with log market capitalizations as weights. Consistent with findings in Table IV, in the chart for the precrisis period, high hedge fund demands are associated with high CAARs in the next year, while most of these return gains reverse in the 2nd year. Such reversals do not exist for stocks with large hedge fund net-buys during financial crisis and afterward, as shown in the bottom chart of Figure 2 . 19 Note that the bottom chart also suggests that the tþ3 to tþ12 return reversals in the crisis period shown in Column 2 of Panel C of Table IV are not driven by stocks with high hedge fund demands in this period.
In light of the above changes in the relationship between hedge fund demands and future returns across the pre-, during, and postcrisis periods, and the fact that hedge fund expansions only exist in the precrisis period, we conclude that the precrisis period is the most appropriate sample period for testing the demand, short-termism, and skill hypotheses discussed in Section 1. Thus, for the rest of this article, we restrict the sample period to the 1st quarter of 2000 to the 2nd quarter of 2007.
THE PORTFOLIO APPROACH
In Section 4.1, we focus on the multivariate regression approach to study the predictive power of hedge fund trading on future stock returns. To gauge the robustness of our results, we now use a portfolio approach as follows for the precrisis period. At the end of each quarter, we sort stocks based on hedge fund trading and divide them into five quintiles. We form a weighted portfolio for stocks in each quintile with the weight being the log of a stock's market capitalization at the end of the quarter. We then compare the returns to these portfolios in the next quarter and the 2nd and 3rd subsequent years. 20 We also form a zero-investment portfolio in each quarter by buying stocks in the quintile with the largest net-buys by hedge funds and shorting stocks in the quintile with the largest net-sells by hedge funds. The top section of Table V reports the average returns to the top and bottom quintiles and the zero-investment portfolio. In the 1st subsequent quarter, the average return to the top quintile portfolio is 4.467%, whereas it is 2.984% to the bottom quintile portfolio. The average return to the zero-investment strategy is 1.483% over a 3-month period and is statistically significant at the 1% level.
The top section of Table V also presents returns to the top and bottom quintile portfolios and the zero-investment strategy in the 2nd and 3rd In each quarter, stocks are grouped into five portfolios based on rankings on hedge fund or other institutional trading. Portfolio Q5 contains stocks that experience the largest net-buys by hedge funds or other institutional investors. Portfolio Q1 contains stocks that experience the smallest net-buys by hedge funds or other institutional investors. For each of these portfolios, the time-series means of returns up to 3 years after the portfolio formation are reported. The raw returns and the Daniel et al. (1997) benchmark-adjusted returns to a zero-investment strategy that is long in Q5 and short in Q1 are also reported. Returns are in percentage. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.
(1) (2) (3) t through tþ3 tþ12 through tþ24 tþ24 through tþ36 Daniel et al. (1997) . 20 We omit reporting tþ3 to tþ12 results in all remaining analyses focusing on the precrisis period because similar to Column 1 in Panel C of Table IV , we find significant return reversals in the 2nd year subsequent to portfolio formation: the average return in this year is 8.027% for the top quintile portfolio, while it is 9.017% for the bottom quintile portfolio. The average return to the zero-investment strategy is À0.990% and statistically significant with a t-statistic of À1.89. Further, consistent with results in Panel A of Table IV , no significant return reversals exist for hedge fund trading in the 3rd subsequent year, indicating that most reversals occur in the 2nd subsequent year.
In the bottom section of Table V , we repeat the analyses in the top section, except that stocks are sorted based on trading by other institutional investors. Results in this section are consistent with and stronger than those in Panel A of Table IV : other institutional investors' trading negatively predicts stock returns in up to 3 years subsequent to the portfolio formation quarter.
One may argue that the above return differences stem from different risk characteristics of stocks rather than hedge funds' demand expansions in the precrisis period. To test if this is the case, we use the Daniel et al. (1997; DGTW hereafter) benchmark-adjusted returns instead of raw returns. Specifically, we group stocks into 125 portfolios in each quarter based on quintiles of size, book-to-market, and return momentum, and the DGTW benchmark-adjusted return for a stock in that quarter is the raw return minuses the value-weighted average return of the portfolio to which the stock belongs. We find that our results remain qualitatively unchanged to this alternative return measure. The DGTW benchmark-adjusted return to the zero-investment strategy buying stocks in the top quintile and shorting stocks in the bottom quintile of hedge fund trading is 1.212% in the next quarter with a t-statistic of 4.67, whereas it is À0.89% in the 2nd subsequent year with a t-statistic of À1.97. In other words, most return gains of this portfolio in the 1st quarter are reversed in the 2nd subsequent year. In sum, results under the portfolio approach are consistent with those from multivariate regressions, showing that our results are robust to alternative estimation methods.
The economic significance of our results for the precrisis period in this section and Section 4.1 can be interpreted from two perspectives. First, the hedge fund expansion-related mispricing for stocks is roughly 1%, which is equivalent to 4% in annualized returns and represents a sizable deviation from stock fundamentals driven by such expansions. Second, such mispricing is relatively widespread in equity markets considering it exists in about 20% of the thousands of stocks traded by hedge funds.
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4.3 THE SHORT-TERMISM HYPOTHESIS Our findings in Sections 4.1-4.2 for the precrisis period can be explained by either the demand or the short-termism hypotheses, which we attempt to disentangle in this section. Under the short-termism hypothesis, hedge funds intentionally pressure corporate managers to maximize near-term performance at the cost of future values and therefore are expected to unwind current trades prior to return reversals. In contrast, the demand hypothesis contends that hedge funds' investment decisions are primarily driven by the need to invest their expanding assets, which does not involve intentionally unwinding of current trading positions. In sum, under the short-termism hypothesis, we expect the return reversals in Sections 4.1-4.2 for the precrisis period to concentrate in stocks with fast trade unwinding by hedge funds.
In each quarter, we divide stocks into "with unwinding" and "without unwinding" groups based on whether hedge funds' aggregate trading in the next four quarters fully offsets their current trading or not, and create a dummy D U equal to 1 for the former group and 0 otherwise. 21 We then decompose hedge fund trading in Equation (2), DIO HF , into those in with-unwinding and without-unwinding stocks, denoted by DIO
, respectively. Thus, the coefficients on these two interaction terms represent hedge funds' predictive power for future returns in the above two stock groups.
The results for one-quarter-, 2-years-, and 3-years-ahead returns are presented in Columns 1-3 of Table VI, respectively. The positive relationship between hedge fund trading and near-term returns in the precrisis period exists in both with-and without-unwinding groups: the coefficients on both DIO HF Â D U and DIO HF Â (1 À D U ) are positive and significant in Column 1. However, when exploring the long-run return reversals for the above two stock groups in Columns 2 and 3, we find that they exist only for without-unwinding stocks in the 2nd subsequent year, based on the negative and significant coefficient on DIO HF Â (1 À D U ) in Column 2. The with-unwinding group, on the other hand, is not associated with significant return reversals in either the 2nd or 3rd subsequent years. In sum, results in this section are inconsistent with the short-termism hypothesis, thereby rendering support for the demand hypothesis.
Mature Hedge Funds and Young Hedge Funds
MATURE HEDGE FUNDS, YOUNG HEDGE FUNDS, AND STOCK RETURNS
Our findings for the precrisis period are more consistent with the demand hypothesis rather than the short-termism or skill hypotheses and represent the price impacts of hedge funds' aggregate expansions in equity markets. In this section, we explore whether different hedge fund groups are affected This table reports results on the predictive power of hedge fund trading for future returns of stocks with or without hedge fund trading in the next 12 months offsetting current trades. Pooled regressions of one-quarter-, 2-years-, and 3-years-ahead stock returns, RET it,tþ3 , RET itþ12,tþ24 , and RET itþ24,tþ36 , are run on hedge fund and other institutional trading, DIO i,t HF and DIO i,t Other , lagged hedge fund and other institutional ownership, IO i,tÀ1
HF
and IO i,tÀ1 Other , and 10 stock characteristics. t-statistics based on standard errors clustered by stock and quarter (Petersen, 2009 ) are in parentheses. The sample period is from 2000:Q1 to 2007:Q2. D U is a dummy equal to 1 if hedge fund trading in the next 12 months offsets current trading and 0 otherwise. Age is the number of months since the stock first appears in CRSP. Yield is dividend yield. B/M is book-to-market ratio. Price is share price. Turnover is the average turnover in the past 3 months. Volatility is return volatility over the past 24 months. S& P 500 is a dummy variable for being in the S&P 500 index. RET À3,0 is the lagged 3-month return. RET À12,À3 is the lagged 9-month return preceding the end of last quarter. Quarter dummies are included in all regressions. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively.
Dependent variable RET it,tþ3
RET itþ12,tþ24 by the three hypotheses to different degrees. Specifically, for reasons discussed in Section 1, we expect that mature hedge funds experience the demand and/or short-termism effects more, while young hedge funds possess more skills.
In each quarter, we sort hedge funds by fund age, defined as the number of quarters since a fund first appears in the Thomson-Reuters' 13F database, and classify the top half as the "mature" funds and the bottom half as the "young" funds. 22 We then use the methods discussed in Section 2.2 to construct the equity trading and lagged ownership of mature funds, denoted by DIO i,t HF,Mature and IO i,tÀ1 HF,Mature , respectively, as well as those of young hedge funds, denoted by DIO i,t HF,Young and IO i,tÀ1 HF,Young . Our findings in Section 4 for the precrisis period are driven by hedge funds' expansions in equity markets. We therefore compare the expansions of mature and young funds. Figure 3 plots the mean equity ownership per stock by mature and young hedge funds at the end of each sample year and shows that mature funds have significantly higher ownership. More importantly, their ownership growth dominates that of young funds and is the driving force for hedge fund expansions in equity markets in the precrisis period.
Next, we examine the relationship between mature and young hedge funds' equity trading and future stock returns. Specifically, we replace DIO i,t , and reestimate Equation (2) for the precrisis period. The Results are reported in Table VII .
Column 1 presents results for one-quarter-ahead stock returns. Both coefficients on DIO i,t HF,Mature and DIO i,t HF,Young are positive and significant with t-statistics of 2.50 and 1.95, respectively, indicating that trading by both mature and young hedge funds has predictive power for near-term returns. Results for 2-years-ahead returns in Column 2 show that the return reversals in Panel A of Table IV are driven by mature funds: the coefficient on DIO i,t HF,Mature is negative with a t-statistic of À2.14. In contrast, young hedge funds' return-predictability is permanent instead of transient because neither coefficients on DIO i,t HF,Young in Columns 2 and 3 for the 2nd and 3rd subsequent years are significant. Overall, these results are in support of the demand and/or short-termism effects of mature funds and the skill effects of young funds. 22 Our age definition may understate the real fund age because some hedge funds existed before becoming big enough for 13F filings. However, this is unlikely to confound our results because our analyses are based on relative age and using our age measure leads to almost identical age rankings to using real ages for funds whose real ages are available from their websites or ADV forms.
MATURE HEDGE FUNDS' EXPANSIONS AND STOCK RETURNS
Our next test to disentangle the demand and short-termism hypotheses from the skill hypothesis is based on the magnitude of mature hedge funds' expansions in equity markets. If the return-predictability and future return reversals associated with mature funds in the precrisis period are primarily driven by the demand or short-termism effects, they should be stronger in periods with larger demand expansions by mature funds because the strength of the above two effects is proportional to these expansions.
Similar to Gompers and Metrick (2001) , we divide the precrisis period into "high-expansion" and "low-expansion" quarters for mature hedge funds. In our context, demand expansions are defined as the quarterly changes in mature funds' total equity holdings, less any price appreciation of the underlying stocks, expressed as a percentage of the total equity in the market. This measure represents the compositional changes in equity ownership resulting from mature funds' demand expansions. Specifically, we calculate the demand expansion of mature funds in a specific quarter as: A hedge fund is classified as a mature fund if its age is above median of all hedge funds at the end of the year, and it is classified as a young fund otherwise. Fund age is the number of quarters since the fund first appears in 13F filings.
We rank quarters in the precrisis period using this measure and define the top half as the high-and the bottom half as the low-expansion quarters for Other , and 10 stock characteristics. t-statistics based on standard errors clustered by stock and quarter (Petersen, 2009 ) are in parentheses. The sample period is from 2000:Q1 to 2007:Q2. A hedge fund is classified as a young fund if its age is below median of all hedge funds at the end of the quarter, and it is classified as a mature fund otherwise. Size is market capitalization. Age is the number of months since the stock first appears in CRSP. Yield is dividend yield. B/M is book-to-market ratio. Price is share price. Turnover is the average turnover in the past 3 months. Volatility is return volatility over the past 24 months. S&P 500 is a dummy variable for being in the S&P 500 index. RET À3,0 is the lagged 3-month return. RET À12,À3 is the lagged 9-month return preceding the end of last quarter. Quarter dummies are included in all regressions. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively. Other , and 10 stock characteristics. t-statistics based on standard errors clustered by stock and quarter (Petersen, 2009 ) are in parentheses. The sample period is from 2000:Q1 to 2007:Q2. A hedge fund is classified as a mature fund if its age is above or equal to median of all hedge funds at the end of the quarter. Mature funds' demand expansion is the quarterly change in the total value of aggregate holding by mature funds, less any price appreciation of the underlying stocks, scaled by the total equity in the market. D H is a dummy equal to 1 if mature funds' demand expansion in the quarter is greater than the time series median and 0 otherwise. Size is market capitalization. Age is the number of months since the stock first appears in CRSP. Yield is dividend yield. B/M is book-to-market ratio. Price is share price. Turnover is the average turnover in the past 3 months. Volatility is return volatility over the past 24 months. S&P 500 is a dummy variable for being in the S&P 500 index. RET À3,0 is the lagged 3-month return. RET À12,À3 is the lagged 9-month return preceding the end of last quarter. Quarter dummies are included in all regressions. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively.
Dependent variable RET it,tþ3
RET itþ12,tþ24 Other , and 10 stock characteristics. t-statistics based on standard errors clustered by stock and quarter (Petersen, 2009 ) are in parentheses. The sample period is from 2000:Q1 to 2007:Q2. A hedge fund is classified as a mature fund if its age is above or equal to median of all hedge funds at the end of the quarter, and it is classified as a young fund otherwise. D U is a dummy equal to 1 if mature hedge fund trading in the next 12 months offsets current trading and 0 otherwise. Age is the number of months since the stock first appears in CRSP. Yield is dividend yield. B/M is book-to-market ratio. Price is share price. Turnover is the average turnover in the past 3 months. Volatility is return volatility over the past 24 months. S&P 500 is a dummy variable for being in the S&P 500 index. RET À3,0 is the lagged 3-month return. RET À12,À3 is the lagged 9-month return preceding the end of last quarter. Quarter dummies are included in all regressions. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Dependent variable: We measure unexpected earnings news by market-adjusted earnings announcement returns, cumulative abnormal returns (CARs), defined as the cumulative stock return over a 3-day window [À1, 1] around the earnings announcement date minus the cumulative return on the CRSP valueweighted market index over the same window. We add the one-quarterahead CARs to Equation (1) and examine whether they are a significant determinant of mature or young hedge funds' trading: i.e., whether these funds trade on future CARs. CARs in the current quarter are also added as a control variable. We estimate this equation using pooled OLS regressions controlling for quarter fixed effects and compute t-statistics using standard errors clustered by both stock and quarter (Petersen, 2009) .
These results are presented in the first two columns of Table X . Column 1 focuses on young hedge funds and consistent with the skill hypothesis, we find the coefficient on CAR i,tþ3 to be positive with a t-statistic of 2.28. In contrast, the coefficient on CAR i,tþ3 for mature funds in Column 2 is not statistically significant. These results suggest that young instead of mature funds are informed about firms' future earnings news. We also examine the aggregate hedge fund trading in unreported analyses and find no association between it and future earnings news, suggesting that the skill effects of young funds are dominated by mature funds when they are pooled together.
24
Our tests on the price pressures of hedge fund expansions focus on the stock level analyses. This is also the approach adopted by Coval and Stafford (2007) and Gompers and Metrick (2001) and is appropriate because an individual fund is unlikely to impose large pressures on equity (1) and (2), and clustered by fund-stock and quarter for regressions (3) and (4). t-statistics are in parentheses. The sample period is from 2000:Q1 to 2007:Q2. A hedge fund is classified as a young fund if its age is below median of all hedge funds at the end of the quarter, and it is classified as a mature fund otherwise. CAR is the 3-day cumulative market-adjusted return around the earnings announcement date. Size is market capitalization. Age is the number of months since the stock first appears in CRSP. Yield is dividend yield. B/M is book-to-market ratio. Price is share price. Turnover is the average turnover in the past 3 months. Volatility is return volatility over the past 24 months. S&P 500 is a dummy variable for being in the S&P 500 index. RET À3,0 is the lagged 3-month return. RET À12,À3 is the lagged 9-month return preceding the end of last quarter.
For regressions (3) and (4), the size of the fund's equity portfolio, TNA, is also controlled. D Young is a dummy equal to 1 if a hedge fund is classified as a young hedge fund and 0 otherwise. D Small is a dummy equal to 1 if the market value of a fund's total equity holding is in the lowest tercile among all hedge funds in the specific quarter and 0 otherwise. Quarter dummies are included in all regressions. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. prices. Since stock picking skills are at the fund level, the skill effects, if they exist, are expected to be at both stock and fund levels. Thus, we also conduct fund level analyses in this section. Specifically, we replace the aggregate hedge fund trading with individual fund trading and examine its relations to future CARs in Column 3 of Table X . In addition to stock characteristics, we also control for the value of the fund's equity holdings, Total Equity Assets (TNA), in this regression to account for the fund size effect. Standard errors are clustered by fund-stock and quarter (Petersen, 2009) . 25 The coefficient on CAR t,tþ3 is not significant: i.e., on average, hedge funds do not trade on future earnings news.
In Column 4, we examine whether young and mature hedge funds trade on future CARs by interacting CAR t,tþ3 in regression 3 with indicators D Young and (1 À D Young ) that the observation represents trading by young or mature funds. One confounding factor for this classification is it could be driven by fund size instead of age because of the high correlation between the two. To address this concern, we further interact fund age with fund size indicators for small and large funds, denoted by D Small and (1 À D Small ), respectively. One needs to be careful to avoid classifying most young funds into small funds and most mature funds into large funds, and we therefore classify funds in the lowest tercile of cross-sectional TNA into small funds. On average, about one-third of young funds belong to the large fund group in each quarter. Results in this column show that young funds that are relatively large have superior information about future earnings news, judging from the positive and significant coefficient on future CARs of stocks traded by young and large funds. Mature funds, in contrast, do not have stock picking skills regardless of their sizes. In sum, these findings support the skill effects of young funds and show that their stock picking skills are indeed associated with fund age instead of size.
Conclusion
This article provides evidence that expansions of mature hedge funds in equity markets exert pressures on stock prices, while relatively young hedge funds possess stock picking skills. We find hedge funds more than doubled their equity ownership in the 7.5 years prior to the financial crisis of 2007-09 and their expansions are mostly driven by mature hedge funds. In this period, hedge funds' demand expansions positively predict onequarter-ahead stock returns and are associated with return reversals in the 2nd subsequent year. In the recent financial crisis, hedge funds shift from expansions to contractions in equity markets and their sell-offs lead to return reversals in the 1st subsequent year.
In exploring the sources of the relationship between hedge fund expansions and future returns in the precrisis period, we show that the return reversals in the 2nd year subsequent to hedge fund trading do not stem from hedge funds' fast trade unwinding. Instead, they are driven by demand expansions of mature hedge funds and disappear in periods of low mature fund expansions. Trading by young hedge funds, in contrast, positively predicts one-quarter-ahead stock returns and earnings news, and is not associated with future return reversals.
Our analyses of the price pressures of mature funds' expansion in equity markets identify a clear mechanism through which hedge funds lead stock prices to significantly deviate from intrinsic values, thereby adding to the institutional price pressure literature (e.g., Coval and Stafford, 2007) and the emerging literature on stock price manipulation by hedge funds (e.g., Cici et al., 2011; Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik, 2011; Ben-David et al., 2011) . We also contribute to the literature on hedge fund behavior in crises (Sadka, 2010; Cella, Ellul, and Giannetti, 2011; Ben-David, Franzoni, and Moussawi, 2012) by documenting the changes in hedge funds' relationship with future returns during and after the recent financial crisis. Moreover, our findings on young hedge funds' stock picking skills and the lack of such skills among mature funds point to a possible explanation for the mixed findings in the literature on hedge fund performance.
